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Collected by the Archivists
The Ukraine List (UKL) #292
compiled by Dominique Arel
30 November 2004
1-Mychailo Wynnyckyj: The Kuchma Regime Fights Back
2-Critical Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine (Monday, November 29, 2004)
[Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL]
3-James Sherr: Ukraine's Elections: The Forces in Play (II) [Part I in UKL 282]
4-Adam Swain: re: Way (UKL289), On Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
5-The Guardian: Gwen Sasse, Talk of an East-West Split in Ukraine Highly Unlikely
6-Wall Street Journal Europe, Grygoriy Nemyria, Ukrainian End Game
7-Salon: Interview with Olena Prytula, Editor of Ukrains'ka pravda
8-The Guardian: PR Man to Europe's Nastiest Regimes (re: John Laughland, UKL 287-289]
**Thanks to Matthew Kaminski, Lisa Koriouchkina, Leonid Polyakov, Natalia Pylypiuk, Max Pyziur, Gwen Sasse,
James Sherr, Adam Swain, Mychailo Wynnyckyj **
**Exceptional up-to-the minute legal and political analysis by Mychailo Wynnyckyj this morning. And a UKL new
feature: Critical Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine**
**In the flurry of translations we are doing, a most unfortunately mistake was made regarding the title of
the article by Sergei [Serhii] Rakhmanin, posted in UKL291, which should read: "The Victorious People of the
Undefeated Country" [and notS"of the Defeated Country]. Our sincere apologies for that mishap and thanks to
Leonid Polyakov for pointing it out promptly. -DA]
#1
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2004 08:04:51 -0500
From: lav_mwynn@connection.ca
Kyiv Nov 30, 2:30 pm local time
Today will go down in history as the day the Kuchma regime fought back.
Three things of significance occurred simultaneously this morning:
1) The Supreme Court opened a session during which it continued its examination
of the case brought against the Central Election Commission by official
representatives of Presidential Candidate Victor Yushchenko
2) The Verkhovna Rada opened a session during which the current political
situation in Ukraine was to be debated -including the threat of
unconstitutional activities of certain forces within Ukrainian society, and
consequences of such actions including the possible dismissal of the Prime
Minister, and the Prosecutor General.
3) Yanukovych held a press conference in which he presented two new
possibilities for resolving the current crisis:
a) Yanukovych suggested that the negotiation process between his team and the
Yushchenko camp be restarted, and that the parties agree to “compromise” –
specifically that the political reform proposal previously debated in
Parliament which gives greater powers to Parliament and the Prime Minister and
reduces the powers of the President be passed, and that Yushchenko agree to
serve as Prime Minister (with expanded powers) under a Yanukovych presidency.
b) Yanukovych also presented an alternative proposal – to agree to call new
elections, but with both Yushchenko and Yanukovych agreeing not to run.
Neither proposal is acceptable to the Yushchenko camp. When asked about the
first option by reporters in Parliament, Yushchenko immediately rejected it as
laughable. But, in my opinion, the fact that both options were publicly voiced
by Yanukovych indicates that he personally has accepted that there is no way
that he will become President given the current situation on the streets. This
in itself is a victory for the Orange Revolution, but it may turn out to be a
pyrrhic one (see below). At this point, the Kuchma regime is clearly trying to
save itself - if necessary by sacrificing Yanukovych and replacing his
candidacy with that of Tyhypko in new elections.
With reference to the Supreme Court proceedings: it is interesting to note that
the lawyer representing the Central Election Commission (i.e. defendant)
essentially remained silent throughout the morning. The presentations by
Yushchenko’s lawyers were thoroughly cross-examined by Stepan Havrysh and the
legal team representing Yanukovych (i.e. the "interested party"), and in
particular by two judges. Both judges repeatedly asked whether the Yushchenko
lawyers could present evidence of court actions being filed in any court of any
level on Nov 21 or 22. Unfortunately the dance of the Yushchenko team could not
hide the fact that the answer was "no" (a very serious oversight by the
Yushchenko camp!!!). The Law on Elections specifically states that any legal
action that questions the legitimacy of the vote at any local-level polling
station must be filed with a court by midnight on the day following the vote.
The law states that legal actions against Territorial Election Commissions and
the Central Election Commission must be filed within 7 days after the vote, but
actions against local polling stations must be filed within 28 hours of the
close of voting. This point was made exceptionally clear by one of the judges
of the Court.
The Yushchenko team fought back with an interesting argument. Article 34 of the
Civil-Procedural Code of Ukraine states that a fact that is “generally known”
does not need to be proven in court, and evidence as to its being a fact is not
required in a court of law. Based on this article, the Yushchenko legal team
argued that providing detailed evidence of fraud and falsification at the local
polling station level is unnecessary because the fact of fraud is “generally
known” as having taken place. OSCE and international observer reports together
with evidence of their having been widely publicized not only in Ukraine, but
worldwide were submitted as evidence that the fact that local-level fraud
occurred is “generally known”. Furthermore, the Yushchenko legal team argued
that the Verkhovna Rada vote on Saturday, and its proclamation of the election
result as having been falsified, made the fact of election fraud “generally
known”. As the Yushchenko team repeatedly stated, the above argument does not
invalidate the mountain of evidence of fraud that has been presented to the
Court, but it does reduce the importance of a detailed examination of the
evidence of local-level fraud. We’ll see what the judges have to say about this
argument - Havrysh and the Yanukovych team were visibly perturbed by it.
Returning to the Verkhovna Rada. Two separate motions were presented this
morning: both condemned those individuals whose recent actions have undermined
the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The first motion (presented by the
Yushchenko forces) specifically named the Prime Minister as being responsible
for destabilizing the current political situation in Ukraine, and called for
the Verkhovna Rada to recommend to the President to dismiss the PM (Parliament
cannot dismiss the PM at the moment because it voted for his program less than
a year ago, and therefore gave the PM immunity from non-confidence motions for
a period of one year – Article 87 of the Constitution). The second resolution
(prepared in haste, and not distributed to deputies in draft form prior to its
being voted as required by Parliamentary procedures), although condemning
separatism, did not specify whom the Verkhovna Rada sees as responsible for the
current situation. The second motion was passed "in principle" (i.e. first
reading) whereas the first was defeated. Pro-government factions and the
Communists voted in favour of the watered-down resolution. Immediately after
the vote, a recess was called in the proceedings until 3pm.
The day continues. The Supreme Court is certain not to rule today, and possibly
not even tomorrow. The Verkhovna Rada has given Yanukovych and the Kuchma team
a temporary respite. The Yushchenko camp now has to reconsider whether its
decision to allow employees of the Cabinet of Ministers access to work today
was a good one. In my opinion, we have all gotten a little too confident in the
“inevitability” of the victory of the Yushchenko forces.
Democratic values will certainly triumph in the short term in Ukraine: the
election will be cancelled, and a new vote will be called. However, the press
is now repeatedly reporting government officials calling for both Yushchenko
and Yanukovych to be barred from running in this vote. That means Tyhipko
becomes the pro-government candidate, and frankly, if given a 90 day campaign
period, I am not convinced that he would necessarily lose to an opposition
candidate like Tymoshenko or Moroz. In other words, the old Ukrainian regime
would be reconstituted with a new face.
Mychailo Wynnyckyj Ph.D.
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv Ukraine
mwynn@lavalink.com
#2
Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine (Monday, November 29, 2004)
Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL
As of November 29, 2004, the concept du jour in the Russian central press is "geopolitics". In one form or
another, most newspapers analyze the situation in Ukraine from the point of view of macro politics (see
excerpts below). Protests in Kiev are presented as a direct result of the US and European Union's involvement
in the elections process.
Many newspapers spend time speculating about what might happen in the near future. Izvestia covertly
introduces an idea of an armed conflict into which Russia might be unwillingly drawn (Dugin, Izvestia #223
(26780)). German expert Alexandr Rahr cautions that the events in Ukraine might cause a split between Russia
and the West (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, #261 (3374)).
Some newspapers discuss the situation in Ukraine as "getting out of hands". "People realize that there is no
longer control", "everything is in chaos", a newspaper reports (Tribuna, #214).
Another analytical approach draws parallels between what is happening in Ukraine and the events in Chechnya in
1991 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Bogomolov, #265). The author states that in Chechnya, the early protests were also
jubilant and were also nationalistically oriented. He then proceeds to emphasize the negative consequences of
the uprising in Chechnya. The implications of his reasoning are obvious. What is not obvious is the degree of
the Russian involvement - an issue that arises out of his comparison as well. However, the author chooses to
gloss over this topic.
"Soviet Russia" offers a different line of analysis (Kotov, "Sovetskaya Rossiya", #154). First, it emphasizes
the economic problems in Ukraine (the majority of the population is below the poverty level, criminals are
governing the country, etc.). But unlike the Russians who naively believe that somebody - be it Putin, or
Zhirinovksy or somebody else, - would come and save them, the Ukrainians are taking active control over their
lives. Their solution is a division of the country on a geographical basis. In this case, at the very least,
their local compatriot would govern themselves, the author concludes.
Moscow's Gazeta offers fairly liberal conclusions (Gazeta #223). It states that the main lesson to be learnt
from the events in Ukraine is the fact that TV control does not guarantee victory. While Yanukovich
controlled most of TV airtime, Yushchenko was out on the streets. Thus, it is clear that a TV propaganda
machine created according with the guidelines of the Central Committee (TsK) ideology department can very
well fail. This machine is neither flexible nor fast. Indirectly, this article offers lessons for Russia to be
learnt.
Gazeta also mentions a note of protest the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine forwarded to the Russian
Government yesterday. "The arrival of Moscow Mayor, Luzhkov, to Ukraine last Sunday was the reason for the
note of protest. Along with Yanukovich, Luzhkov participated in the legislative assembly meeting that decreed
"the creation of an independent state in the Eastern Ukraine with a capital in Kharkiv should the political
power be allocated to Yushchenko and the opposition". At the assembly meeting, Luzhkov called actions of
Yushchenko's supporters an "orange-fed orgy" and said that he is willing to take off his famous cap to look
more like Yanukovich."
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (NZ) concludes that the Ukrainian crisis is slowly spreading over to Russia (Riskin,
Postnova, Shapovalov, "NZ", #261). Thus, the Don Cossacks are supporting Yanukovich and are even ready to
offer military assistance should the need arise. Meanwhile, [Volga] Tatars are allying themselves with
Yushchenko. An address to the Ukrainians signed by a leader of the influential Tatar Public Center in
Naberezhniye Chelni, Rafis Kashapov, expresses the support of Crimean Tatars (especially in Simferopol) who
are organizing rallies in Yushchenko's support. Youth organization Azatlyk ("Freedom"), Volga Tatars of
Chuvashia and Udmurtia, Shura Aksakal (Elders' Assembly of Tatarstan) cheer for Yushchenko (see the Tatars'
and Cossacks' addresses to the Ukrainians below). It is important to point out though that Mentimer Shaimiev,
the President of Tatarstan, refused to meet with the press and to state his position in this regard.
Similarly, the state authorities are in no hurry to announce their position towards the Ukrainian elections.
Thus, Tkachev, a governor is Krasnodar, abstained from any political statements. Mikhail Nikovayev, a
governor of Kursk, Yuriy Lodkin, a governor of Bryansk, Vladimir Kulakov, a governor of Voronezh, and Evgeniy
Savchenko, a governor of Belgorod, are silent as well.
NZ also analyzes attitudes of the Ukrainian armed forces (NZ, #261, Mukhin). The author of the article
concludes that political neutrality of the army will strengthen separatist tendencies in the country. At the
same time, militia leaders in several regions announced their support of Yushenko. However, in the majority of
the regions the Ministry of Internal Affairs units support "Nasha Ukraina" ("Our Ukraine"). According to NZ,
a German analyst Gisbert Mrozek (aktuell.ru) reports that the Security Agency of Ukraine (SAU) headed by Igor
Smeshko is Yushchenko-oriented. However, the current neutrality of the army is not caused by the fact that the
military personnel are politically disengaged. In Sevastopol, 7% of the Navy voted for Yushenko, while 90%
seamen were for Yanukovich. Increases in salary and the past administrative politics are largely responsible
for this outcome.
Technically speaking, the boundaries of the military and administrative units in Ukraine fully correspond
with the "blue" and "yellow" division of the country after the presidential elections. In terms of numbers,
there are more administrative territories where Yushchenko won. Air Forces Headquarters divisions (Vinnitsia)
and the Northern (Chernihiv) and Western (L'viv) ground troops are located in the West. The Navy headquarters
(Sevastopol) and the Southern ground troops (Odessa) headquarters are located on the territories sympathizing
with Yanukovich. However, the most mobile and active military divisions are stationed in the south, i.e., in
Crimea where Kiev was concerned of possible turmoil among the Crimean Tatars and the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The newspaper concludes that given the combined military power, the Southeast of the country is stronger.
Also, due to the overall centralization, discipline and the use of administrative resources, the neutrality
of the Ukrainian military might lead to a paradoxical situation when "strivings on behalf of the South-Eastern
regions towards independence will not prevent the country's overall disintegration. Furthermore, the
formation of the pro-Russian autonomous regions is favorable to Moscow. Hence, it is doubtful that the
Kremlin would organize any form of physical support of these regions. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet is a
strong factor in favor of independence of Crimea and other southern regions".
Excerpts cited above:
[1] Ukrainian Crisis Unravelling Throughout Russia
by Andrei Riskin, Vera Postnova, Aleksandr Shapovalov
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 30 November 2004
"We, the Cossacks of the Rostov Cossack division , are worried over the recent developments in
brotherly Ukraine. We fully support the Donetsk regional Duma's decision about the creation of the South-
Eastern Ukrainian Autonomy in case of a coup d'etat. Should the people of Donetsk and Lugansk region decide to
join Russia, we will accept their decision with joy. In case of a coup d'etat and the humiliation of
Ukrainian citizens, we are requesting the army Ataman Vodolatzskiy to use the state structures of the Russian
Federation to assist the Cossack organizations of Don, Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the realization of their
constitutional rights, including the right for people's self-determination."
"Dear Ukrainians! Citizens of Ukraine!
We, Tatars, are closely following your fight for dignity and independence of your own country in all the
vital manifestations. We support your struggle. Like you, the Ukrainians, we share similar historical roots
and similar sufferings of the recent history. Questions that arose in the course of the Presidential elections
in Ukraine showed that these questions are vital for the very organization of the world community. The right
solution of these questions will contribute to the just organization of the World. We believe that in order
to prevent unavoidable consequences the President of Ukraine should be the candidate whom the Ukrainian
people favor. Everyone would have to take that into consideration" (From the Appeal of the Tatar Public Center
to the People of Ukraine, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, #261 (3374) 30.11.2004
[2] "Two Ukraines": Geopolitical Crisis and the Card of Civil War
by Aleksandr Dugin
Izvestiia, 30 November 2004
Events taking place in Ukraine have deep geopolitical meaning. Ukrainian statehood is only in the early
stages of its development. Ukrainian public opinion is void of consensus about its future development. Some
Ukrainians perceive their future connected with the West. Others could only imagine their fate in close
contact with Russia. Given this situation, only moderate and balanced politics that incorporate both
perspectives could preserve the unity of Ukraine. Skillfully lobbying with both Washington and Moscow, Leonid
Kuchma pursued precisely this type of politics. In terms of geopolitics, there is not one but two Ukraines and
it would take years and years to consolidate both.
Russia could not remain indifferent to this situation and could not abstain from supporting Yanukovich. She
simply reacted to defend its national interests. However, events continue to develop along such lines that
Russia is unwillingly drawn further and further into the conflict despite the complexity of the situation.
Yushchenko continues to follow his original argument and intends to become a president of even half-Ukraine.
His self-declared oath, appeals to the revolutionary nationalistically oriented masses and other means of
influence prove that he will continue to follow in this direction. In order to preserve if not Ukrainian unity
then at least a part of it, Russia has nothing else left but to support Yanukovich. Political agitations are
so high in Ukraine that one can hardly anticipate peaceful resolution of this situation.
Despite some hasty conclusions, it is obvious that Yushchenko's presidency is not a solution. Even if Eastern
Ukraine does not rise up immediately (the state of mobilization among this part of the population is lower
than among the "Westerners"), it will rise tomorrow or the day after as a reaction against Yushchenko's
politics. And once again, Russia would be compelled to interfere. However, this time it would be under much
less favorable conditions. If the plan to preserve a united Ukraine with a moderately pro-Russian president
(only Yanukovich can be such a president) fails, in the worst-case scenario, it would be extremely important to
offer support to the pro-Russian regions - Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
One should do anything possible to avoid a war as long as possible. However, after a certain critical point,
a war has to be won.
[3] The Moment of Truth
by Viktor Konstantinov
[source currently unavailable as I am editing this. Will post in next UKL-DA]
30 November 2004
Ukrainian events remain at the center of public discussions in Russia. A thorough analysis of their causes is
yet to be carried out given that the political crisis continues to escalate and its resolution is not yet
clear. However, the analytical community has already learnt some profound lessons.
Events in Ukraine are a moment of truth for Russia. A historical time out that our country received in the
beginning of a new millennium is over. Having secured their positions in the Baltic States and partially in
the Central Asia, i.e., in the areas of Russia's traditional geopolitical influence, the West continued a
strategy of expanding its boundaries ("ob'edaniya bolshogo piroga s krayev"). Now Ukraine's turn has come. Of
course, Western political elites are not a spawn of Satan; they are acting according with their understanding
of the national interests of their states. To maintain social stability and a certain life style, the
economies of the "Atlantic Community" should work very effectively. To do so, it requires access to
exhaustible natural resources (carbon-and hydrogen-based first and foremost) that the West lacks. In the "new
world order" era, they - and particularly the US as the only superpower, - are striving to gain access to the
world resources that would be free of any competition. To attain this goal, they are ready to use political
and power means and to bribe the ruling "aboriginal" elites. Russia is lucky enough to have preserved its
"nuclear teeth" and hence its ability to defend its national interests.
That is the reason why the standoff between Yanukovich and Yushchenko is not just a fight of two different
political and economic fractions of the Ukrainian elite (i.e., self-sufficient Donetsk businesses that
control most of the Ukrainian industries and a part of the business-elite that is closely connected with
transnational and international financial organizations) that diverge in their perspective on the future state
development. Nevertheless, much of the mass media is trying to present the situation in this way. For
instance, an influential British newspaper "Financial Times" made the following claim in an article with a
meaningful title: "Ukrainian voters do not need Moscow's advice": "The candidate's differences in
perspectives on such important questions as political system and geopolitical orientation of Ukraine largely
explain the high level electoral engagement of the population. Yushchenko embodies the Western definition of
a democrat, a fighter with corruption, an ally of the European vector of development and NATO. Yanukovich
represents the interests of the oligarchic groups in Donetsk and is considered a pro-Russian politician.
In reality, on the geopolitical level one should be talking about a new phase in the realization of the
global repartition that follows the "new world order" rules: termination of Russia's influence over the
politics and economics of a brotherly country ("bratskogo ee narody respubliki"). Western influential circles
are striving to show the world that Russia no longer has the will to defend its vital interests and should no
longer be considered. On the other hand, Yushchenko's failure could demonstrate to the "Atlantic allies"
("Atlantisti") the ability of the Commonwealth of Independent States to withstand Western expansionism .
[4] The split [raskol] of Ukraine could lead to a split [rassol] between Ruissia and the West
by Alexander Rahr
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 30 November 2004
When Moscow comes to terms with the idea that the fate of all the Slavic countries lies with the United
Europe, many conflicts between Russia and the European Union would no longer arise. Ukraine cast a challenge
to Russian diplomacy. Russia made a lot of grave mistakes in the elections campaign in this country. Putin
scared away many of the pro-Russia oriented Ukrainians who could have voted for Yanukovich prior to Putin's
visit. Putin's involvement was so severe that many were afraid to vote for a pro-Russian candidate. And
indeed, Yanukovich has become more of a pro-Russian than a Ukrainian candidate. Moscow risks losing Ukraine.
Together with Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Baku, Kiev might prefer to strengthen the formation of GUUAM (that
includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). Then, the formation of a single economic
space between Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus that Russia has been striving to create would no longer be
viable.
However, another scenario - a split between Russia and the West is quite probable. A formation similar to
Pridnestrovye or the Abkhaz quasi-state could emerge in the Eastern territories of Ukraine. One can refer to
these states as the "black holes": they exist as economic entities but are not recognized by the world
community. If such a "black hole" emerges in Eastern Ukraine, it would be largely dependent on Russia.
Without economic resources of Eastern Ukraine, Western Ukraine would lose money and resources. Then, Western
Ukraine would be dependent on the West, i.e., the European Union and the US. It will be a very weak state.
Russia has underestimated Western political strategies towards Ukraine - the willingness and ability of the
West to interfere with the Ukrainian conflict. Russian diplomacy must have assumed that the European Union,
the Security Council of Europe and the United States would behave the way the did in the case of elections in
Central Asia and Caucasus, i.e., they would actively criticize but would not interfere. However, in the case
of Ukraine, the West took active actions. In my opinion, the West became scared that with the help of Ukraine,
Russia might try to restore the former empire. The West became afraid of Yanukovich. Americans were the first
to question legitimacy of the elections. The European Union could not do anything else other than to follow
the lead of Washington.
The battle for Ukraine is slowly becoming a battle for the future of Europe. However, this is not just any
battle. It is a clash of two different conceptual definitions of 21st century Europe. The European Union and
the US are expanding their civilization towards the East. However, this is not a conquest but is a spirit of
our times, the construction of the democratic institutions propagated through globalization. The situation in
Ukraine shows that the ideas of democracy, civil society, and human rights are infiltrating the post-Soviet
space.
Many in Ukraine remember Putin's speech in the Reichstag that was radically different from the speech he
delivered during his meeting with the European leaders. Back then Putin spoke about the importance of the
democratic values, economic potential and questions of security for the emergence of the large Europe. I think
it is not too late to return to these discussions. However, Russia cannot lose Ukraine. Connections between
Russia and Ukraine are too strong. Also, Belarus will preserve its orientation towards Russia. And Europe
understands this very well. However, the Slavic family needs to be strengthened. When Russia understands that
the fate of the Slavic countries is with the united Europe, many of the conflicts that arise would no longer
take place.
#3
Ukraine's Elections: The Forces in Play (II)
James Sherr
Conflict Studies Research Centre (UK)
28 November 2004
1. Despite contradictory developments and several promising ones, the possibility of a violent outcome
has increased within the past few days. The convening of separatist assemblies in three eastern oblasti
(regions) is an ominous development, less indicative of a genuine separatist threat than a made-to-order
pretext for the forceful suppression of Viktor Yushchenko's followers. As of 23.00 Kyiv time 29 November,
there are several unconfirmed reports that 12-20,000 police, Interior and special purpose forces are trying to
enter/have entered the centre of Kyiv or that they are approaching the city.
2. On 25 November, the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared that it had decided to accept an appeal from
Yushchenko and adjudicate on the legality of the elections, until which time the results would have no legal
standing.(1) On 26 November, an EU brokered mission conducted joint discussions with President Kuchma, Prime
Minister Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko. (2) On 27 November, a considerable majority of the Verkhovna Rada
(Ukrainian parliament) declared the election result illegal (3). This train of events has accelerated
defections from the Yanukovych camp (including, most suspiciously, Yanukovych's campaign manager and National
Bank chairman, Serhiy Tyhypko). (4) Additionally, components of Kyiv based Ministry of Interior forces
declared their support for Yushchenko. So have former Minister of Defence Yevhen Marchuk and six generals of
the SBU. (5)
3. Against this backdrop, the Kharkiv regional legislature declared (26 November) that it would adopt
self-rule and establish control over military forces on its territory before accepting orders from the
'extreme right wing' authority of Yushchenko. On 29 November, a 'Northern Donetsk All-Ukrainian Congress of
Peoples Deputies and Deputies from All Levels' convened near Luhans'k. The latter assembly was attended not
only by Prime Minister Yanukovych, but the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, a major investor in Crimea, who has
long fostered separatism there and a hard, 'chauvinistic' approach towards the country as a whole. Both
assemblies carefully stopped short of declaring secession.
4. Despite real divisions in the country, these developments, unlike those in central and western Ukraine,
are orchestrated from the top. Ukraine's regional governors are not elected, but appointed by the president,
power is wielded effectively, and civil society is muzzled. Whilst the threat of secession serves local
interests, actual secession does not. Kharkiv's authorities feel threatened by the 'Donetsk clan' of
Yanukovych-Akhmetov, as do those of Dnipropetrovsk, who do not support secession. Akhmetov is in sharp
competition with Russian business interests, and he certainly understands that a secessionist entity would be
almost totally dependent upon Russia. The pro-Yanukovych southern regions oppose secession, and the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (the one region where separatist sentiment is found) has only raised the issue of
'autonomy' (which is consistent with its current constitutional status). For these reasons, many suspect
that the latest developments serve a Russian scenario rather than an eastern Ukrainian one. (6)
5. President Putin's calculations remain a critical variable. Thus far, his policy has been based upon
a combination of deliberation, delusion and guile, all underpinned by compelling geopolitical interest.
These interests far outweigh any gains that might be achieved by honest collaboration with third parties.
Putin's greatest delusion, endemic to the circles who advise him, is the underestimation of Ukrainian national
consciousness and civil society. Deliberation, reflected in the intimate involvement of Russian 'political
technologists' in Ukraine's electoral fraud, has run into the buffers of these delusions. Now the Kremlin
fears that events are moving out of its control ('we have dropped out of the circle of active players'). (7)
To regain control, it is necessary to change the game. Secession, the means to this end, launches a new game.
6. If this conclusion is correct, then both Kuchma and Putin will shift the ground of discussion from
democracy and legality to the right of Ukraine's authorities to 'hold the country together'. Kuchma, a weak
but infinitely supple figure, has already done this. On 29 November, he declared secession 'unacceptable
under any circumstances': a formula designed (even in the face of a Supreme Court ruling) to provide
legitimacy for a forceful solution. Western governments should be wary of adopting this language, thereby
giving credence to a largely fabricated scenario and inadvertently providing legitimacy to a course of action
that we earnestly seek to prevent.
Endnotes
1. The hearings, which began on 29 November, are being conducted by the civil branch of the court, which
consists of respected judges thought to be independent of presidential patronage and pressure.
2. The mission comprised Javier Solana (EU High Representative for the Common Foreign & Security Policy), Jan
Kubis (Secretary General of the OSCE), Alexander Kwasniewski (President of Poland), Valdas Adamkus (President
of Lithuania) and Boris Gryzlov (Chairman of the Russian State Duma and Putin's Special Representative). The
Ukrainian participants comprised President Kuchma, Prime Minister Yanukovych, Viktor Yushchenko and Volodymyr
Lytvyn (Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament).
3. The first of eleven resolutions, approved by 307 of 391 deputies present (out of 450), declared that the
elections did not convey 'the general will' of the voters. The second resolution expressing lack of
confidence in the Central Electoral Commission received 270 affirmative votes.
4. Tyhypko has a reputation for inordinate ambition and for sharp and unprincipled relationships with allies
as well as adversaries. He also has a murky past. At the same time, he is a skilful operator and a very
able economist with an aura of pragmatic modernism and favourable image in some Western financial circles.
Like many who have risen to prominence in the Ukrainian and Russian financial communities, he has a strong
Komsomol (Communist Youth League) background, and many have questioned how he emerged almost overnight from
an individual of modest means into a multi-millionaire. Albeit a long-standing rival to Yushchenko, _uchma
has distrusted him, possibly owing to his back channels to Russian political and financial circles, and he
declined to support his candidature to the premiership after Yushchenko's dismissal in April 2001. Given
this pattern, it is possible that Tyhypko is preparing the ground to be the regime's 'compromise' candidate if
a third round of elections takes place and Yanukovych is forced to drop out.
5. These include General Skybynets'kiy, adviser to SBU Chairman Ihor Smeshko (but now without line
responsibilities), General Skipal'skiy (adviser and a former Deputy SBU Chairman) and four other unnamed
general officers. Whether these are serving officers, advisers or retired officers is not indicated. For his
part, General Smeshko has stated: 'I rule out any use of force against our own people. The SBU states again
that it will not interfere in political processes'. This posture of studied neutrality has made it possible
for SBU officers sympathetic to the opposition to provide it with some timely intelligence. Yet there is no
open source indication thus far that the SBU has withdrawn intelligence, security and communications support
from the President, Presidential Administration and government.
6. It is still unclear what role, if any, Russian spetsnaz might play in this scenario or others. Earlier
reports of their presence are given credence by a carefully detailed compilation of eye-witness accounts in
the respected Russian newspaper, Kommersant, on 29 November. The paper reiterates earlier reports that one
mission of an estimated 800 troops is to exfiltrate presidential, governmental and SBU documents to Russia.
The article contains highly specific but sporadic accounts of landings and surface movements of detachments
and 'traces' [slediy] of 'Vityaz' special purpose MVD forces at Gosmotel' aerodrome (near Irpin'), Vasil'kov
military aerodrome near Kyiv and Kyiv Boryspil International Airport.
7. The view of Alexei Makarkin, Deputy General Director of the Political Techniques Centre, Moscow, (Gazeta,
29 November). Other Russian analysts convey an atmosphere of confusion, setbacks, redployment of forces,
rethinking of tactics and a determination to fight from new positions. According to the respected
geopolitician, Aleksandr Dugin, whose views are regarded sympathetically by the Kremlin, 'a war must be
avoided to the last possible moment. If this becomes impossible, the war must be won' (RIA Novosti, 29
November).
#4
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2004 09:55:49 +0000
From: "Adam Swain"
Lucan Way is quite correct to be skeptical about the democratic credentials of Yuschchenko and some of his
core supporters. From 1993 until 1999 Mr Yushchenko was the head of the National Bank of Ukraine where he was
credited in the west with stabilising the economy. However during this time the NBU became embroiled in a
dispute with the IMF about the misuse of funds and the overstatement of its reserves. Mr Yushchenko's deputy
in the recent election campaign, Yulia Tymoshenko, is widely known as an 'oligarch' from her time as head of
United Energy Systems (UES). Under prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, UES emerged as a monopolistic supplier of
Russian oil and gas and Mrs Tymoschenko and her relatives accumulated significant personal wealth. Whereas
Lazarenko, who was widely believed to have received bribes from UES, fled to the USA where he was arrested and
faced charges of embezzlement, , in a classic example of 'poacher turned game keeper' Tymoschenko, became
vice-prime minister with responsibility for fuel and energy when President Kuchma appointed Mr Yushchenko
prime minister in December 1999. As prime minister Yushchenko and Mrs Tymoschenko attempted to structurally
reform the energy sector Tymoschenko became dogged by corruption allegations. In January 2001 she was sacked
by President Kuchma and became embroiled in two criminal investigations, during which she was briefly
imprisoned on two occasions, that accused her of bribery and trading contraband gas. Although the cases were
ultimately dropped, she was convicted by a Russian court of bribing Russian officials and her husband and
father-in-law were imprisoned in Ukraine.
[Adam Swain is Lecturer in Human Geography, School of Geography, University of Nottingham]
#5
Ukraine at the brink of a break-up?
Talk of an east-west split in Ukraine is oversimplified and highly unlikely
by Gwendolyn Sasse
The Guardian, 30 November 2004
Dr Gwendolyn Sasse is a lecturer in eastern European politics at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, email: G.Sasse@lse.ac.uk
The mass protests following the second round of the presidential elections on November 21 have brought
Ukraine to the most decisive moment since gaining independence in 1991. Much of the discussion surrounding
the disputed election portray an image of the east-west political split of the country along ethno-linguistic
lines or a Russian-Western conflict over Ukraine. A violent break-up of the country is presented as the worst-
case scenario.
These views are reminiscent of the debates over the future of Ukraine in the early 1990s. We seem to have
come full circle. The circularity of the analysis on Ukraine is epitomised by the revival of Cold War
rhetoric among Western observers, depicting Ukraine as the battleground for US/EU and Russian influence and
interests. This polarised image is underpinned by over-simplistic representations of Viktor Yushchenko as
'pro-Western' and his opposite, Viktor Yanukovych, as 'pro-Russian'.
Moreover, the Cold War rhetoric overestimates Western leverage in Ukraine. After all, the West has been
hesitant in its engagement with Ukraine for most of the last thirteen years, and the EU has kept Ukraine at
arms length in the debates over enlargement.
Most importantly, much of the recent discussion about Ukraine misses the key point about the current impasse
in Kiev, namely that this is a political standoff over domestic political issues (the Kuchma regime,
corruption, oligarchic influence, media controls etc.).
The country's potential disintegration, however, is a more complex issue. It raises the prospect of major
instability on the EU's new eastern border. Again, however, the prospect of an actual partition of Ukraine -
along the lines of support for Yushchenko and Yanukovych - is overblown and is as unlikely now as it was in
the early to mid-1990s.
In its 1991 borders, independent Ukraine is a historical novelty. Four empires - the Habsburg, Russian,
Ottoman and Soviet empires - left their mark on different parts of Ukraine and made regional differences one
of its most prominent characteristics. They include ethno-linguistic, religious, socio-economic and political
differences.
However, a necessary emphasis on the regional factor in Ukrainian politics neither calls Ukraine's
territorial integrity into question, nor precludes successful state- and nation-building. In fact, the
regional factor has also had a stabilising effect, given that whoever rules in Kiev has had to balance
diverging regional political and economic interests and search for compromises. Ethno-linguistic differences
between Russians and Ukrainians, or Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, tend to be overemphasised by
Western observers. These categories are not mutually exclusive and do not make for clear-cut political
allegiances. Religion is also not a clear ethnic or political marker.
Socio-economic differences, heightened by the legacies of Soviet-era economic planning, provide for the most
potent divisions in Ukraine. While it is hard to describe Ukraine's eastern regions as an economic powerhouse,
the west is clearly dependent on the east. The north-western and central regions are primarily agricultural,
whereas the east is Ukraine's old industrial heartland where the coal mines, steel industry and the once
powerful military-industrial complex are located.
The eastern regions are also the home base of many of Ukraine's influential oligarchs who have supported
outgoing president Leonid Kuchma and Yanukovych. The oligarchs themselves, however, are not a united force.
Their clashing interests will undermine the political cohesion of any greater south-eastern region.
The regional political elite of Donetsk, the stronghold of ex-governor Yanukovych, has threatened to hold a
referendum on regional autonomy in early December if what they call a 'constitutional coup' succeeds and the
election result is overturned. This announcement is primarily an attempt to regain some of the political
momentum in view of the high visibility and strength of the pro-Yushchenko demonstrations.
The timing of this call for a referendum, which is now echoing in other south-eastern regions like Luhansk
and Crimea, reveals its main aim. It is an attempt to influence the Supreme Court hearings, which could
result in a re-run of the elections. Given that it is hard to gauge the actual strength of Yanukovych's
support base, his political allies are attempting to reframe the issue at stake. The image of Ukraine's east-
west split is a powerful political weapon, and it attracts attention abroad. It is, in fact, a last-resort
strategy by the Yanukovych camp.
Fortunately, the prospect of the split materialising is extremely slim. If the Supreme Court rules in favour
of Yushchenko, several regions in the south-east might stage a referendum on autonomy or secession. But any
secessionist initiative will stop at this point, as there is no coherent south-eastern political agenda, and
neither Russia nor the West would encourage a split.
The current political polarisation, including an east-west dimension, will persist beyond the decision about
the country's new president. Any new president will have to continue balancing regional interests. It is
feasible that current events in Ukraine will provide new momentum for a discussion about the decentralisation
of local and regional decision-making powers in Ukraine, but these issues will only be addressed after the
current standoff has been resolved.
#6
Ukrainian End Game
by Grygoriy Nemyria
Wall Street Journal Europe, 30 November 2004
Mr. Nemyria is director of the Center for European and International Studies in Kiev and chairman of the
International Renaissance Foundation.
KIEV -- Whatever the final outcome of Ukraine's political crisis,
the country's civil society has passed its biggest test. Walk the snowy
streets and squares of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities and see the
hundreds of thousands of people peacefully protest against criminality
and for democracy. Attend the crowded meetings of the newly established
Trade Union of Journalists or the colorful gatherings of the university
strike committees. The reaction of the people to shameless electoral
fraud vividly shows that Ukrainians don't just believe in democracy but
also intend to practice it.
It remains to be seen whether the current leaders will be able to do
the same. Outgoing President Leonid Kuchma still has a chance to help
arrange a peaceful transition of power rather than try to block it or
even let things turn violent. In the coming days, the challenge for
Viktor Yushchenko -- who by everyone's but the government's count won
last Sunday's presidential elections -- will be to sustain the momentum
and to defend his victory. The challenge for Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych, whom the ruling establishment wants (or, at least as of last
week, wanted) in that job, is to defend the tainted victory declared by
the Central Election Commission -- and of course, Vladimir Putin. (The
Russian president prematurely recognized the prime minister's "win,"
shortly followed by the remarkable troika of Belarus dictator Alexander
Lukashenko, the boss of Moldova's separatist Trans-Dniestr region, Igor
Smirnov, and last but not least the Serbian war criminal, Slobodan
Milosevic.)
There are two ways out of the current predicament. The first one
would use the existing laws and political negotiations. Parliament's
support for the democrats marching in the streets, including the highly
symbolic but non-binding vote this weekend that declared the elections
invalid, isn't enough on its own. Mr. Kuchma would need to support any
constructive legal solution, including the re-voting of the second round
that he backed yesterday, without letting his underlings interfere.
The weak link here is the Ukrainian court system. Toothless and
subservient to the executive branch in the past, the courts aren't
trusted by either side. But the Supreme Court, which took up the
opposition challenge to the election yesterday, will still be a player.
Its decision, probably later this week, could either pave the way for a
legal solution or trigger an escalation in the conflict. Acknowledging
that the opposition has the momentum, and with even the president
wavering, Mr. Yanukovych yesterday for the first time indicated that he
would consent to a rerun of the elections, if election fraud was proven.
The sooner a resolution is found, the better. Any delay will
destabilize the situation.
The second scenario involves continued civil disobedience, which
carries a higher risk of violence. That risk would surely increase if
the first option of political comprise fails. To avoid that outcome,
Ukrainians should continue to "internationalize" their domestic conflict
by bringing in legitimate and responsible outside mediators. Friday's
round table talks involving the EU's foreign policy tsar, the Polish
president and Russia's Duma chairman was a good start.
There's little time to waste. As the democratic opposition makes
gains, blocking government building and forcing the end of censorship at
the state-run media, the Yanukovych camp is increasingly desperate. On
Sunday, his supporters -- deputies and governors from some eastern and
southern Ukrainian regions -- called a referendum on establishing a
south-eastern Ukrainian federal region with Kharkiv as its capital. Even
Mr. Kuchma denounced this move as illegal. Raising the wild card of
separatism is a form of blackmail. The eastern regional elite -- a mix
of "red directors," former Communist Party apparatchiks and the new
national nomenklatura united around the invisible core of Ukrainian
oligarchs and their clans -- are running scared. They'd all agreed that
Mr. Yanukovych was the safest pair of hands to take over from Leonid
Kuchma, and never figured that the Ukrainian people might have different
ideas.
Behind the move toward a referendum, now slated for this Sunday, is
a cynical attempt to transform and expand the Donbass from a "captured
region" into a "captured state." Alongside Mr. Yanukovych, Moscow Mayor
Yuri Luzhkov, a loyal Putin ally, took active part in drawing up the
referendum plan this weekend. Already having staked so much credibility
on a Yanukovych "victory," the Kremlin's back-up plan here may be to
carve out a Russian-speaking, border region from Ukraine. The Russians
don't care much about their compatriots in the "near abroad." In
reality, Moscow would love to anchor Ukraine, or a large chunk of it, in
a post-Soviet space with Russia being the undisputable hegemon.
Regional differences matter in Ukraine's domestic politics as well
as in its foreign and security policies. Eastern Ukrainian oblasts share
a number of common characteristics: A considerable number of ethnic
Russians; territorial proximity to Russia; a concentration of heavy
industry and old Soviet military-industrial plants; a "Soviet" value and
political system.
Eastern Ukraine is complex. But one can say for sure that the
collective identity of those regions is much more tied to the land, the
place, than to ethnicity. Even if people there feel close to Russia, it
doesn't mean that they consider themselves Russian or reject their
(non-ethnic) Ukrainian identity. For that reason, Mr. Yanukovych and his
supporters will have a harder time than outside observers realize in
injecting ethnicity into the current crisis.
The referendum isn't a new idea. Local "consultative" referendums
took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 1994 in parallel with
the presidential elections. Voters were asked whether Ukraine should
become a federation and should Russian be recognized as the country's
second state language. Around 80% said yes. But those votes weren't
binding. Two years later, the national constitution defined Ukraine as a
unitary state, seemingly quashing any separatist designs -- until the
sitting prime minister, a man who is charged with defending that
constitution, felt anxious enough to raise the specter of separatism
anew by giving his support to the referendum plans. The threats of a
break-up of Ukraine, even a civil war, should be seen as just that, the
threats of scared regional clans. The resignation of Serhiy Tyhypko from
the position of the governor of the central bank and head of the
Yanukovych election campaign yesterday, ostensibly in protest against
the referendum in the east, is a sign of the growing tensions within the
ruling elites.
This dramatic presidential election is not, contrary to so much
commentary inside and outside Ukraine, a choice between the West and
Russia. The choice is between the consolidation of autocracy and
consolidation of democracy here and throughout the region. And it is not
a choice that Ukraine is facing alone. The resolution of this crisis
will help determine the future for open and pluralistic politics in
Belarus, in Russia, and throughout the former Soviet space.
For a long time after independence in 1991, Ukraine lacked the
internal momentum to reform and change. The struggle in Kiev, regardless
of the shenanigans in eastern regions or the Kuchma government's
stonewalling, shows that the country is ready to move forward toward
Europe. Ukraine has stable growth, true political competition, a vibrant
civil society, and a young middle class. The current fight will
determine whether a healthy democracy is added to that mix.
Ukraine needs solidarity and support in this critical juncture of
its history. It's not begging for a signal from the European Union or
the West as a whole that it belongs. By its actions, the Ukrainian
people are sending a strong signal themselves.
#7
Where democracy refuses to die
The media was pro-government. In much of the country, the election machinery was controlled by the ruling
party. Voter fraud was rampant. But the people of Ukraine will not surrender.
by David Talbot
Salon, 30 November 2004
Nov. 30, 2004 | Progressive American voters, still downcast over the results of the presidential election --
as well as an election system gravely impaired by the antiquated Electoral College, fraud-inviting
electronic machines, and rampant political abuses -- can take vicarious pleasure these days from Ukrainian
democracy. Throughout the presidential campaign in the former Soviet republic, opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko struggled against a government-controlled media and election machinery that heavily favored his
opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, the handpicked successor to the country's corrupt and thuggish president, Leonid
Kuchma. But when Yushchenko was denied victory in the Nov. 21 election, after widespread fraud, the
opposition leader and his supporters did not fade away -- they took to the streets and refused to accept the
official version of the election.
With the Ukrainian Supreme Court still deliberating the opposition's election challenge -- and the democratic
revolution in full flower on the wintry streets of Kiev -- Salon spoke with Olena Prytula, editor in chief of
Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), the courageous Web site that has been responsible for some of the
country's only aggressive, independent coverage of the Kuchma regime. Prytula's partner, Georgi Gongadze, was
kidnapped, murdered and beheaded four years ago -- an execution that a former bodyguard of Kuchma later
charged was personally ordered by the president. In the past few weeks, Prytula and her small staff have
thrown themselves into covering the dramatic election and aftermath, with traffic to her site ballooning to
five times the normal flow. Prytula spoke by phone from Kiev, after another long, exhausting day, about the
democratic uprising that contains "some small part of my work and my soul."
Are you hopeful that the Supreme Court will rule in favor of the opposition?
It could take several days for the decision. I hope that the opposition has enough documents to prove the
election was stolen.
Even Kuchma said on Monday he favors new elections.
Yes, but this is not good. To make a new election is very difficult. The opposition will have to raise new
money, run new campaigns, it's very expensive. And everybody is tired of elections already. So I'm not sure
it's the best choice for Ukraine. If Kuchma wants a new election, it probably means he hopes to find another
candidate who will be stronger than his last one, Yanukovych. Nobody trusts Kuchma -- so I don't trust him
when he says he wants new elections. It means he has something up his sleeve.
Is he thinking of running himself?
No, he said today that he will not enter the race.
So Yushchenko is not pushing for a new election -- he wants the Supreme Court to rule that he was the real
winner of the last election?
Yes, that's true. The opposition is hoping that the Supreme Court will find that the vote in several regions
was fraudulent. Most of the regions were in the east and central Ukraine, where Yanukovych is strong. His
people control the government in these regions and control the vote count. You know, as Stalin said, it
doesn't matter who votes, it's who counts. So we have the same situation -- the Yanukovych people did the
counting.
But the local media in these regions have a lot of video documentation that these elections were not fair and
transparent. So the truth is getting out.
Do you believe the Supreme Court will rule in the opposition's favor or the government's?
We don't know.
Is it similar to the U.S. election in 2000, when it was all but certain how the Supreme Court in Washington
would rule, because it was stacked with Republican appointees?
Well, it's true that our Supreme Court justices feel very strong pressure from the Kuchma government right
now. But on the other hand these justices see the thousands of people on the streets and they don't want to
be enemies of these people. So I believe in the end, they will behave properly and make a just decision.
There's discussion that Ukraine may split in two, with the eastern region, which is more closely linked to
Russia, breaking away if Yushchenko becomes president? Do you think this is a real possibility?
Yes, I do. Ever since Ukraine became independent, no one even thought about that. But it's only now, when
Russian advisors who work for Yanukovych are pushing him on this, that this question arises. Because of his
Russian advisors. Throughout the campaign, these advisors positioned him so that Yanukovych was supposed to
represent the east, and Yushchenko the west. Actually, the election results showed that Yushchenko has
support in the center of the country and partly even in the eastern regions.
The other problem is that people who live in eastern Ukraine did not get any reliable news and information
during the campaign about Yushchenko and his program. Actually this was true of people throughout the country.
They were bombarded with slanted media coverage and negative campaign ads that said Yushchenko was very
nationalistic, that he wanted to split Ukraine and so on. And then you must realize that the governors in the
eastern region know that if Yushchenko becomes president, they will lose their jobs. So they are fighting for
their political survival. That's why they are pushing for secession. And Yanukovych is too.
Do you think Putin is supporting the idea of secession?
Yes, he's very pro-Yanukovych; he even campaigned for him and said publicly he wished for him to win. The
whole idea of Yanukovych as a successor to Kuchma is very important to Putin -- because he himself was a
successor, and he wants to hand his own government to a successor. If voters in neighboring Ukraine frustrate
their government's succession plan, it sets a bad precedent for Putin in Russia.
What's the mood on the streets of Kiev?
The orange people, as the opposition people call themselves, are very happy. Orange is Yushchenko's campaign
color. Yanukovych's colors are blue and white, so we call them the blue and white people. But the orange
people are all smiling and singing. And when people from eastern Ukraine come to the center of Kiev, which is
where the demonstrations are based, they give them tea and coffee and food. The orange people are dancing and
singing our national anthem -- it's suddenly become our most popular song! (Laughs) Can you imagine?
So the winter cold is not dampening protesters' spirits?
Well, yes, it's very cold. It was minus 10 Celsius the other night. It's always snowing and sometimes there's
a bitter wind. But people are very strong. I walk home from my office at 2 o'clock in the morning, and I walk
through the tent city where the orange people are camped out. And people inside are dancing -- and they're not
drinking or drunk. Most of them are young people. And during the day, a lot of people who live and work in
Kiev drop by and give them food and offer their support. Every evening opposition leaders hold meetings, and
there are hundreds of thousands of people in the streets. There are music groups. And they have even written
new songs about the current situation, the revolution that is taking place. There's one popular song called
"Yushchenko, Yes!"
I'm very proud right now of the Ukrainian people. It's like all the people are brothers. The other day I saw
people from government offices, standing near their doors. And then two babushka walked by and stopped and
said, "Are you OK, are you tired, are you cold? You can come to the tent city and have some tea." So people
are just so happy with each other. They realize they can change something, they realize they are a nation --
for the first time since independence from the Soviet Union.
And people are even reaching out to the elite troops that are guarding the presidential administration
buildings. Girls are laughing with them, they are dancing in front of them, they are trying to make them
smile. Can you imagine!
So the people of Ukraine are reveling in their democratic strength for the first time since independence?
Yes, this is true. And this is why I am so proud. And I also realize that there is some small part of my work
[as an independent journalist] and my soul in this revolution. That's why I am so happy.
Do you think of Georgi these days?
Yes, I do. And so do the people in the streets. There's a street in the center of Kiev called Bankova Street,
which is where the presidential administration is located. And the people from the tents have begun calling
it Gongadze Street. They know that once Kuchma is gone, it will be officially renamed Gongadze Street.
Yesterday was the fourth anniversary of the day that a socialist leader released those tapes and everybody
knew that Kuchma was involved in Georgi's death. [Kuchma has denied the validity of the audiotapes, on which he
is purportedly heard ordering his security agents to eliminate the troublesome journalist.] It was the 28th
of November, 2000.
Is Yushchenko in any danger right now?
Yes, everybody's in danger. But I believe everything will be OK.
Do they use the fact that he's married to an American woman against him?
Of course! All the time. "How can you be Ukrainian when your wife and children are American?" That's what
they say.
Do you think there will be violence?
I hope not. But right now we can see that Yushchenko and Kuchma are talking in different languages. So they
can't hear each other. Yushchenko is very democratic, very polite, he doesn't want to split Ukraine. But
Kuchma has come out today in support of the deputies in the east who favor secession. The situation is still
very much up in the air.
Is there any concern about Yushchenko's health? His face still shows signs of the mysterious poisoning he
suffered earlier in the campaign (which the opposition leader charged was the work of government agents). Is
he holding up all right?
I don't know, but he is working very hard every day. You can see him in the snow and the cold. I have not
heard anything bad about his health from his supporters. But Yanukovych supporters like to play up the health
question. They tell people that he will die in a few years, so who will be our president then. But he's
looking very strong.
#8
PR Man to Europe's Nastiest Regimes
David Aaronovitch
The Guardian, 30 November 2004
Whenever, as this past week, eastern Europe is on the news, so too is a man called John Laughland. Last
Sunday he was playing Ukrainian expert on the BBC's The World This Weekend, the day before he was here in the
Guardian defending the Ukrainian election "result", and at the beginning of the month he was writing for the
Spectator - also on Ukraine.
Laughland's great strength is that he sees what no one else in the west seems to. Where reporters in Kiev,
including the Guardian's own Nick Paton-Walsh, encounter a genuine democracy movement, Laughland comes across
"neo-Nazis" (Guardian), or "druggy skinheads from Lvov" (Spectator). And where most observers report serious
and specific instances of electoral fraud and malpractice on the part of the supporters of the current prime
minister, Laughland complains only of a systematic bias against (the presumably innocent) Mr Yanukovich.
A quick trawl establishes this to be the Laughland pattern over the past few years and concerning several
countries. Laughland has variously queried the idea that human rights are a problem in Belarus, or that the
Serbs behaved so very savagely in Kosovo. He has defended Slobodan Milosevic, criticised the International
Tribunal in the Hague and generally argued that the problem in countries normally associated with human
rights abuses is, in fact, the intervention of western agencies.
It was the British Helsinki Human Rights Group hat that he was wearing last Sunday. On its website the BHHRG -
of which Laughland is a trustee - describes itself as a non-governmental organisation which monitors human
rights in the 57 member states of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Laughland is
listed as a trustee, the historian Mark Almond (to be found writing about the Ukraine in last week's New
Statesman) is its chairman.
Founded in 1992, the BHHRG sends observers to elections and writes reports which - along Laughlandish lines -
almost invariably dispute the accounts given by better known human rights organisations. This stance has led
to the BHHRG being criticised by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (established in 1976)
as preferring "the role [is to take] PR flak for a new breed of authoritarian rulers in Europe" to the
business of actually monitoring abuses.
So what on earth is going on here? I know nothing about BHHRG's finances, but the ideological trail is
fascinating. Take the co-founder of the group, Christine Stone. She was a lawyer before she helped set up
BHHRG. Since then she has "written for a number of publications including the Spectator and Wall Street
Journal on eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union".
This information comes from a US website called Antiwar.com where, for a while, Stone had a regular Thursday
column. But Antiwar.com was not a leftwing site opposing the Iraq war. It was a rightwing site set up to
oppose the Kosovo intervention in 1999. Its "editorial director" was a man called Justin Raimondo who was
active in the small US Libertarian party before joining the Republican party. In the 1992, 1996 and 2000
elections he supported the campaigns of Pat Buchanan, the far-right isolationist candidate.
Raimondo is also an "adjunct scholar" with the Ludwig von Mises Institute. This is a libertarian think-tank
in Auburn, Alabama, founded by one Lew Rockwell, who describes himself as "an opponent of the central state,
its wars and its socialism". A contributor to Rockwell's own site is Daniel McAdams, who is - in his own words
"honoured to be associated" with the British Helsinki Human Rights Group.
Trail 2. Laughland is also European Director of the European Foundation (patron, Mrs M Thatcher), which -
judging by its website - seems to spend most of its time and energy sending out pamphlets by arch-Europhobe
Bill Cash. A synopsis of one of Laughland's own books, however, notes his argument that, "Post-national
structures ... and supranational organisations such as the European Union - are ... corrosive of liberal
values (and) the author shows the ideology as a crucial core of Nazi economic and political thinking."
Beginning to get the picture now? Trail 3 leads us to Sanders Research Associates, a "risk consultancy" for
which Laughland is, according to their website, "a regular contributor" and to which companies can subscribe
for information and advice. The "principal" is a Chris Sanders. The kind of steer Sanders gives his customers
can be adduced from this report on the morning of the US presidential election. "We will be very surprised,"
he wrote, "if on Wednesday John Kerry has not won a clear majority of electoral college votes and that his
supporters are not nursing substantial post vote celebration hangovers, if not still drinking the champagne."
Lots of people got that one wrong, and some blamed their own judgment. Not Sanders. "Our bet," he says
following the results, "is that we will soon be adding an investigation into the biggest vote fraud in
history.'"
Sanders, it seems, is not beyond the odd bit of conspiracising. In a bulletin from June 2002 he also has
something to suggest about the Twin Towers atrocity. "It was obvious then, and it is obvious now," he writes,
"that something besides the brilliance of a band of terrorists or the incompetence of America's security
apparatus was responsible for the disaster of 9/11." But he doesn't tell us what that "something" was.
Sanders on America and Laughland on Ukraine, however, are not the most amazing features of Sanders Research
Associates. That distinction belongs to the report on Rwanda written for Sanders by a Canadian lawyer named
Chris Black. Black is the only person I have ever seen putting the word genocide in quotation marks when
applied to Rwanda. Rwanda, you see, was all the US's fault, and wasn't carried out by Hutus in any case. It
was all got up to justify US intervention in the region. He condemns the "demonising (of) the Hutu
leadership".
Since 2000 Black has been the lead counsel representing General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, chief of staff of
the Rwandan gendarmerie, at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He is also chair of the legal
committee for the international committee for the defence of Slobodan Milosevic. Last year (though not for
Sanders) Black went on a delegation to North Korea. The report he wrote on his return is full of references
to happy peasants, committed soldiers and delightful guides. The North Korean system, he suggested, being
"participatory", was in many ways more democratic than parliamentary systems in the west.
This is weird company. And what we seem to have in Laughland and his associates is a group of right-wing anti-
state libertarians and isolationists, suspicious of any foreign entanglements, who have somehow morphed into
apologists for the worst regimes and most appalling dictators on the planet.
And where does it all end up? A couple of weeks ago Sanders commended to his clients "John Laughland's series
of articles [showing that] the attack on Iraq is just the southern offensive of a larger campaign to tighten
the noose on Russia." And he continued, "What is less well understood are the risks that the unravelling
political compact in Israel poses for the United States and Great Britain, whose political processes,
intelligence services, military, media and financial establishments are so thoroughly enmeshed with Israel's."
Read that last sentence again and then ask yourself: in what way are Britain's media and financial interests
"thoroughly enmeshed" with Israel's?
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UKL 291, 30 November 2004
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Canadian and International law.
Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa
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