Головна сторінка | Архів новин | Архіви в світі | Корисні посилання | Контакти | Карта порталу

Із зібраного архівістами
Collected by the Archivists

Світова преса про вибори в Україні-2004
Архів матеріалів, відібраних і упорядкованих
професором Домініком Арелем, Університет Оттави, Канада

Матеріали розділу підготовлено до публікації
на порталі Оленою Лісняк (Держкомархів)

Ukrainian Elections-2004 as mirrored in the World Press
Compiled by Professor Dominique Arel for The Ukraine List
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

This section was prepared for posting on the Archive's portal
by Olena Lisniak (State Committee on Archives of Ukraine)


The Ukraine List (UKL) #302
 compiled by Dominique Arel
 6 December 2004
 
 1-AFP: European Mediators Huddle With Ukraine Rivals Amid Signs of  Deal
 2-UPI: Q & A: Daniel Bilak on Kuchma's Calculus
 3-The Guardian (UK): Gwendolyn Sasse, An End Is In Sight
 4-Ira Straus: re: Wynnyckyj, "What Happened in Parliament Saturday"  (UKL301)
 5-Times (UK): Kuchma  Seeking Immunity
 
 6-Der Tagesspiele (Berlin): The Chancellor and Ukraine [UKL  translation]
 7-Critical Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine  (Saturday, December 4, 2004)
 [Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL]
 
 8-CEPS Policy Brief: Ukraine and the EU after The Orange Revolution
 9-Maclean's (Canada): Interview with Jim Jacuta (CIUS Ukraine  Transparency and Election Monitoring Project)
 
 **Thanks to Daniel Bilak, Lisa Koriouchkina, Peter Lavelle, Julia  Luetsch, Ira Straus, Gwendolyn Sasse, Marko 
Suprun, Frank Sysyn,  Kataryna Wolczuk, Yulia Yarotska, Roman Zurba**
 
 **The Canadian government and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress are  announcing major initiatives to bring 
hundreds of international  observers from Canada to the third round (or "repeat second round")  of elections in 
Ukraine. All details in the next UKL, probably  tonight. We will also include information about American and 
European  initiatives in that regard --DA**
 
 #1
 European mediators huddle with Ukraine rivals amid signs of deal
 by Gali Tibbon
 Agence France-Presse, 6 December 2004
 
 #2
 Date:  Mon, 6 Dec 2004 18:34:33 +0300
 From: Peter Lavelle 

 #3
 There are hurdles aplenty in Ukraine's presidential marathon but an  end is in sight
 by Gwendolyn Sasse
 The Guardian (UK), 6 December 2004

 #4
 From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com
 Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 12:40:19 EST
 
 (The time of testing and temptation: will Yushchenko keep his  promises?)
 
 Ira Straus
 (U.S. coordinator, Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO,  an independent international non-
governmental organization)
 
 Dear Dominique and UKL list,
 
 It seems to me there is an easy enough way to resolve the concerns  of Mychailo Wynnyckyj ("What Happened in 
Parliament Saturday, and  Implications", ULK 301). Wynnyckyj fears that Kuchma might sign one  part of a 
package deal (the political reform part) and veto the other  parts. This fear provides the argument for 
Yushchenko to renege on  his commitments on political reform. The reneging has already divided  the pro-
Yushchenko majority coalition.
 
 The simplest solution is to write into the political reform bill a  clause stating that this bill cannot to be 
regarded as enacted into  law unless and until there is full timely (date specified) enactment  and signature 
of the other portions of the package. Thus, if Kuchma  were to fail to sign the other parts, the political 
reform part would  also fail to become law.
 
 It is extremely important for Yushchenko to keep his promises to  moderates in Ukraine, such as his agreement 
with the socialists on  political reform. It is a disturbing sign that he has thus far  started letting his 
radical faction of supporters peel him away from  his promises.
 
 As soon as the Supreme Court handed him the victory on the third  round of the election, some people imagined 
that they could dispense  with their previous agreements. They cannot -- not if they want a  solid, united, 
governable Ukraine.
 
 Yushchenko and his camp are now being tested by temptation. Moderate  Ukrainians will be watching whether they 
give in to the voice of  temptaton at this early stage. After all, they will have plenty of  greater 
temptations after coming to power. And there will always be  the argument for further consolidating power.
 
 Yushchenko, unlike Saakashvili, does not represent anything close to  national consensus. He needs to keep 
building consensus as far as  feasible, not revert to his radicals who would destroy it.
 
 The radicals want a strong presidency as a means (1) for radical  economic reform, (2) for linguistic 
ukrainization.
 
 The second purpose is extremely divisive. Yushchenko needs to stick  to his campaign promises to make Russian-
speakers feel at home. He  should be thinking about measures to give Russian a status as a state  language, not 
further ukrainization. Linguistic ukrainization will  probably gradually proceed over time, as an organic 
development, but  as a government-enforced project it is an offense against a large  part of the citizenry. It 
is a good example of how exaggerated  nationalist ideas and demands for unity serve in practice to  undermine 
the unity of a country. It is the kind of mistake that's  encouraged by those latter-day Schmitteans in the 
West who are trying  to rehabilitate ethnic nationalism vis-a-vis the milder civic  variant.
 
 As to the first purpose, no miracles should be expected  economically. Ukraine is a mess, yet it is growing 
impressively.  Practically all the post-Soviet space is a mess. Visions of miracles,  if the "right" people 
come to power, have always proved mirages,  except perhaps in the Baltics where the national socio-political  
culture was cohesive and western enough to support rapid  transformation.
 
 Anyway, it is my understanding that the political reform would  actually come into effect only after a year's 
delay. This would give  Yushchenko time to break up enough of the power concentrations that  Kuchma built, so 
as to ensure a solid future for Ukrainian democracy.  The path to that future thereafter lies through consensus,
 not any  kind of Jacobinism.
 
 One should not forget how much Gorbachev accomplished in six short  years through the method of consensus, 
bequeathing a post-Soviet  space with broad freedoms and almost unanimously oriented toward  becoming market 
democracies. Or how little Yeltsin accomplished in  his eight years, after the initial burst of changes which 
however  destroyed consensus. Putin reverted to consensus methods and  accomplished a lot more, even if the 
accomplishments have become  mixed as to which way they are taking the country. Jacobinism has  failed, and the 
objective conditions in Ukraine can be expected to  make it a disaster there, too, if attempted.
 
 Such a disaster would forfeit the fruits of the orange revolution  and leave Ukraine back in the same mess of 
constipating divisions  that it has suffered ever since independence. It is through methods  of maximum 
feasible consensus that Yushchenko can move the country  forward sustainably, even if not with breakneck speed.
 
 Yushchenko won the election by appealing to the center, saying that  he would be good to Russian-speakers, and 
good to Russia as well as  the EU and NATO. By these means he won the votes of Kiev and the core  of Ukraine 
that holds the country together.
 
 The role of the West in this may not be insignificant. Its  influence, intentional or not, is considerable. It 
should encourage  Yushchenko to do the following:
 
 1. keep his promises.
 
 2. proceed with political reform, within a carefully arranged  package to be sure so it does not undo the 
revolution.
 
 3. be good to Russian-speakers, e.g. consider state status for  Russian.
 
 4. be good also to Russia, e.g. develop further economic integration  with it alongside the slower process of 
integration with the EU.
 
 5. keep his radicals under control and subordinate to the broader  national interest.
 
 If Yushchenko does all this, the "revolution" will succeed. No  matter who wins subsequent elections, there 
will be no  counter-revolution.
 
 In order to play this role, the West will have to make an effort,  not just act mechanically. The EU could try 
to make the three "common  space" plans (EU-Russia, EU-Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine) compatible, but  as far as I 
can tell, it hasn't tried; instead it has proceeded with  its usual blindness to export the complications, with 
the result of  acting divisively toward Ukraine. If the EU were to try and Russia  were to refuse to arrange a 
compatibility of spaces, that would be  different, and the political consequences in Ukraine would also be  
very different.  NATO's behavior has been better, but it may face  plenty of temptation in the near future. If 
Ukraine comes into NATO,  then Ukraine and NATO will be tempted to kick the Russian fleet out  of Sevastopol, 
although it is hard to see what need there would be  for doing so. The base might better become a joint NATO-
Russia one  under the auspices of the NRC.
 
 The West will also have to ignore the advice and pressure of its own  Polish and Ukrainian nationalists. They 
have thus far predominated in  what the West hears about Ukraine and have encouraged a highly  divisive, 
crudely two-camp approach to it. It will help if more  moderate voices with more comprehensive and balanced 
conceptions  start making themselves heard.
 
 Despite the prevalence of extremists in the media-think tank  discourse on Ukraine, it seems eminently 
feasible, given past  experience, that the West could play a constructive moderating role.  Several times 
already, the US has acted as a brake on Ukrainian  nationalism. It insisted that Ukraine return its nuclear 
weapons to  Russia. To be sure, Russia was singularly ungrateful for the help,  announcing virtually the day 
after that it didn't need and didn't  want the West as a mediator in its relations with Ukraine. Those  
relations remained rocky, and further Western mediation did indeed  help in the eventual resolution of the most 
contentious points. The  West joined Russia in welcoming the election of Kuchma over Kravchuk,  who was seen as 
increasingly just a Ukrainian nationalist doing  nothing good for his country's reform. Russia again was less 
than  grateful, harping on its phobias instead about Western interference,  and competition for influence on 
Ukraine actually picked up during  Kuchma's reign even as Russian-Ukrainian relations calmed down. Of  course, 
Ukraine is a sensitive area for Russians. The Russian  reaction would have been far worse if the Western role 
had been more  negative.
 
 I am sure Russia will not be sufficiently grateful if the West now  helps Ukraine maintain its balance in 
policy toward Russia and toward  Russian-speakers. Nevertheless the West ought to do it, for two good  reasons:
 
 First of all, it is the right way to help Ukraine. The West is  winning; there is no need to act out of fear 
and make Russia a bigger  loser in the process. Doing so would only hurt Ukraine, exacerbating  its East-West 
division and sacrificing the victory to the demons of  revenge. A case for revenge is, to be sure, being made 
at this time,  in defensive language as is the usual mode, based on two-camp  reasoning: Russia is defined as 
the enemy, defeat of its interests is  defined as the essence of Western and democratic victory, and  
compromise with any of those interests is viewed as compromising or  betraying the revolution. Among those who 
write this way, Russia is  pretty openly perceived as the devil, triumphing everywhere with  infinite power and 
guile. Accordingly, any acceptance of its  interests means an intrusion of the devil who will inevitably take  
over everything. Meanwhile, back in the real world, Russia is not  triumphing everywhere, it is losing just 
about everywhere, and it has  legitimate interests whose acceptance would not mean betrayal of  anyone to the 
devil. It is losing precisely because its own  "analysts" adopt the same two-camp devil-theory approach in 
reverse,  saying that the US is triumphing everywhere that it has a foot in the  door. They have led their 
government down the suicidal path of  forcing the issue on either-or terms, as if to hope for exclusion of  the 
inevitable Western influence. The result is that Russia lost out,  faced with a moderate candidate who had the 
wisdom to appeal to the  political center. Now the West may find itself tempted to follow  Russia in such a 
self-defeating attitude; if it were to do so, it  would quickly drive the Ukrainian revolution into the ground. 
The  main substance of the emerging democratic victory in Ukraine exists  in itself, independent of anything 
anti-Russian. By conciliating  Russia and Russian-speakers, the West would consolidate the victory,  not betray 
it. Russian influence in Ukraine is inevitable, as is  Western influence. In the long run, the health of 
Ukrainian democracy  depends on finding ways for Russia to represent its interests and  exercise its influence 
legitimately within the democratic system, as  the West also will presumably do.
 
 Second, because the West has important, legitimate interests in  relations with Russia. If the West were to 
encourage a punitive  extremist policy on the part of Yushchenko, the Russian paranoid  reaction would rise to 
much greater heights than it has already  reached. Russian paranoia would in fact get empirical verification,  
making it hard ever to dislodge the impression and heal the damage to  relations. That "verification" might not 
seem persuasive to some  Westerners who would argue that Russia was at fault for doing wrong  first and was 
only repeaing the consequences, but most moderate  people everywhere wisely reject this "he hit me first" way of
  reasoning. "He hit me first" is relevant when it comes to resolving  the immediate fight, and any concomitant 
power struggle over the  terms for avoiding future hitting, but not the public policies that  flow thereafter. 
It is always the responsibility of the victor to  keep his mental balance and avoid getting dizzy with success.
 
 Yushchenko is going through his time of testing and temptation. He  has stumbled. It is important for him to 
pick himself up and make it  through.
 
 #5
 Kiev's Strongman Seeks Immunity
 Mark Franchetti and Askold Krushelnycky, Kiev
 The Times (UK), 5 December 2004

 #6
 The Chancellor and Ukraine
 Putin's Waiter
 by Christoph Marschall
 Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), 1 December 2004
 [translated by Julia Luetsch for UKL]

 #7
 Overview of the Russian Central Press on Ukraine (Friday, December  3, 2004)
 Prepared by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL
 
 The response to the Supreme Court decision about the third round of  elections in Ukraine was striking. On the 
one hand, newspapers in  Russia offered the Russian interpretation of the events in Ukraine.  On the other hand,
 political forecasts became extremely popular.  "What would happen ifS" scenarios inspired quite a few 
predictions.
 
 RUSSIAN RESPONSE
 
Gudok interviewed the head of the regional elections commission  Sergei Yusov who personally visited over a 
hundred different voting  stations in Donets'k and Luhans'k regions (Tikhov Cherkasova,  "Devilish Dances on 
Kreshchatik", Gudok, 12/4/2004). Yusov argues  that violations during the elections were minor. He points out 
that  even today Kyiv cannot dispute neither the fact that 85% of  southeastern Ukraine supported Yanukovich, 
nor that the turnout rate  was 100% in some regions. He quotes the results of voting in the  Southern Russia. 
Almost 90% of Ukrainian citizens who came to the  voting station at the regional consulate of Ukraine voted for
  Yanukovych. Yusov argues that political crisis in Ukraine would have  negative repercussions for Russia as a 
whole and for border  territories of Russia in particular. The general consul of Ukraine in  the Southern 
Regional constituency of Russia, Pyotr Andrienko also  supported Yanukovich. Andrienko protests against 
violations of the  Constitution taking place in Ukraine right now. He is also concerned  that Donets'k, 
Luhans'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv regions and a part  of Zaporizhzhia are encouraged towards autonomy. He 
argues that these  regions are "milking cows" of Ukraine and as such are fairly  self-sufficient. The majority 
of the population of these regions is  working while people in Kyiv are out protesting.
 
 ON RE-VOTE
 Izvestia quotes Putin as saying: "Running the runoff elections once  again would not achieve anything. One 
could organize elections for  the third, fourth, twenty fifth time until one of the parties  involved does not 
receive the results it needs". Izvestia states that  the Russian government does not consider this a political 
loss; only  one battle but not the whole war is lost (Yusin, "Ukrainians are up  for a third round", Izvestia 
No. 227-M (26784)).
 
 FORECASTS
 
Izvestia foresees two possible scenarios of the situation in Ukraine.  First of all, Moscow could honorably 
surrender and accept  Yushchenko's victory (Yusin, "Ukrainians are up for a third round",  Izvestia No. 227-M 
(26784)). It could try to establish a dialogue  with him. The second option is to accept a challenge and to 
move on  to the third round with the intention of winning it. After all, only  half of Ukraine is ready to 
support Yushchenko. Izvestia concludes  that the Kuchma-Yanukovych team has too much to lose to give up their  
hopes right now. A "witch hunt" would ensue should Yushchenko win (it  might happen despite his will as his 
collaborators might encourage  political prosecution). To avoid losing this round, Yanukovych needs  just one 
thing - to win. While it is difficult, it is not impossible,  Izvestia cheerfully speculates. There are three 
conditions that might  allow Yanukovych to win. First of all, he needs to bring back his  potential electorate -
 all gasterbeiters from Russia, - in time for  elections. Secondly, he should demand international observers'  
presence during the elections in the Western regions of Ukraine. And  finally, he needs to persuade his 
"Russian colleagues" not to  interfere in the internal affairs of a brotherly but nevertheless  sovereign state.
 
Komsomolskaya Pravda also outlines 3 possible scenarios (Anisimiov,  "What Should Russia Expect of Ukraine?", 
Komsomol'skaya Pravda, No.  203). The first one is re-vote. Yushchenko's victory is highly  probable in this 
case. The miners of Donbass have always been  apprehensive of Yushchenko who closed coalmines earlier on the  
premise that it was cheaper to purchase coal in Poland. In this case,  issues of Russian language and double 
citizenship might become  problematic. Also, it is obvious that Ukraine would become more  Europe-oriented in 
this case. Then, it would affect Russia in regard  to geopolitics. However, it might prove economically 
profitable for  Russia. KP hypothesizes that then Ukraine would become more  transparent for foreign investors. 
The presence of European companies  in Ukraine is negligible while Russian companies have always had a  strong 
presence there. Thus, Russian financial-industrial groups  would have an advantage.
 
 [The other two scenarios have been superseded by the Court decision  -DA]
 
 WHITHDRAWAL OF UKRAINIAN FORCE FROM IRAQ
 
Izvestia reports that on Friday, with 257 votes "for", Rada passed a  resolution about withdrawal of Ukrainian 
soldiers out of Iraq  (Stepanov, "Rada voted to withdraw soldiers from Iraq", Izvestia,  #227-M (26784)). The 
right-wing opposition, the left wing and the  centrists supported this resolution. Pyotr Symonenko reminded that
  both Yushchenko and Yanukovich insisted on this withdrawal in their  elections campaign. However, Yushchenko 
supporters objected to this  decision. Yuriy Kostenko, the leader of the Ukrainskoy Narodnoy  Party, said, 
"This is an effort to influence the West so that it  would decrease its support of our democratic opposition". 
A member of  Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc, Andriy Shtil' remarked that this resolution  does not have any power 
until it is approved by president. Currently,  there are 1,589 Ukrainians serving in Iraq. Since August 2003, 9
  soldiers died and over 200 were wounded. Maintenance of the military  regimen in Iraq costs about $20mln a 
year.
 
 In its analysis of this resolution, Kommersant argues that it is  important to pay attention to the political 
intentions of the parties  involved (Kolesnkov, "Repeat, Please", Kommersant #228). Thus, while  originally, 
Yushchenko was one of the strongest proponents of  withdrawal, the Rada's decision might take this trump card 
out of his  hands. If Kuchma signs the resolution, it would mean that the  authorities aim to disarm the 
opposition leader and are preparing for  the third round of elections. According to Aleksei Yedin, a member of  
"Trudovaya Ukraina", the motivation for this resolution is unclear.  Offended by Tyhypko's decision to resign, 
the deputies might have  decided to introduce a contentious issue in the relations between  Yushchenko and the 
West, Yedin argues.
 
 FOREIGN PRESS
Izvestia reprinted an article from the Guardian about a new movement  emerging in Ukraine (No Comment, Izvestia,
 #227-M (26784)). Thus, the  students in Kharkiv oppose both Yanukovich and Yushchenko. The young  residents of 
Kharkiv united under a green flag and a slogan "We are  for Peace". They built a tent camp in the center of the 
city and  inundated the city with thousands of green ribbons. To facilitate  peaceful negotiations, they 
organized a soccer game. Both teams  participating in the game consisted of supporters of Yushchenko and  
Yanukovych. Also, the students erected a Christmas tree that they  encouraged people to decorate with orange 
and blue ribbons. "We would  like to prevent conflicts between the "orange" and the "white-blue","  - a 
graduate student of Kharkiv State University Dmitriy Tkachev  said. - "Even 12-year old school kids are 
fighting among themselves  defending Yushchenko or Yanukovich. We would like to persuade the  Ukrainians that 
politicians are simply using them to further their  personal goals".
 
 UKRAINIAN IMPACT ON RUSSIA
 
 Meanwhile, events in Ukraine continue to stir political responses in  Russia. Thus, the Prefektura of the 
Central Administrative  Constituency of Moscow announced that theatrical forms of protests  that became popular 
lately should be considered public entertainment  and as such fall under the jurisdiction of Luzhkov's 
resolution about  entertainment events. Thus, it becomes significantly more difficult  to organize events of 
this kind. Now, a petition for a permission of  these events would need to be submitted one month prior to the 
actual  event, Kommersant reports (Kashin, "Prefektura responds to "goat"  offense", Kommersant, #228). 
Theatrical actions of protest became  extremely fashionable in Moscow. Earlier this year, Communist party  
activists organized a performance entitled "Vova, Go Home!" A girl  representing president's mother came out on 
a street and yelled  "Vova, Go Home!". Several dozen young men wearing masks with Putin's  face came out to her 
call. This performance had a tremendous  resonance in the city. A party "Rodina" organized a similar show  
during the meeting of "Yedinaya Rossiya". Members of the party  brought a live goat covered in bearskin to the 
hotel Cosmos where an  assembly meeting of "Yedinaya Rossiya" took place. Participants of  the show shouted: 
"You are not bears, you are goats". However, after  the recent resolution, such actions are far less likely to 
happen.  One of the young activists expressed his indignation by pointing out,  that mandarins at Yushchenko's 
rally or white-blue posters and  scarves in Yanukovych's support are akin to a theatrical show as  well.
 
 #8
 Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 13:04:20 -0000
 From: "Kataryna Wolczuk" 
 
 Ukraine and the EU after The Orange Revolution
 
 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl,
 Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk
 
 CEPS Policy Brief No. 60/December 2004
 
 
 This article is also available on the website of the Stefan Batory  Foundation in Warsaw (www.batory.org.pl) 
and as Policy Brief No.  17/2004 of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of  Ukraine in Kyiv 
(www.foreignpolicy.org.ua).

 #9
 A "Grotesquely Corrupted Result"
 by Danylo Hawaleshka
 Maclean's (Canada), 6 December 2004

********************************************************************** **
 
 UKL 302, 6 December 2004
 
 Fair Use Notice: MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL THAT IS  REDISTRIBUTED FOR PERSONAL, SCHOLARLY USE ONLY. UKL 
is a single  emission e-mail to a limited number of scholars and professionals in  the area of Ukrainian 
studies who have requested receipt of the list  for scholarly and educational purposes. UKL is not archived 
anywhere  on the web and is distributed on a completely volunteer basis. The  UKL editor believes that the use 
of copyrighted materials therein  constitutes "fair use" of any such material and is governed by  appropriate 
Canadian and International law.
 
 Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies
 University of Ottawa
 559 King Edward Ave.
 Ottawa ON   K1N 6N5 
 CANADA
 tel  613 562 5800 ext. 3692
 fax 613 562 5351
 
 For a free subscription to UKL, write to darel@uottawa.ca
На початок
На початок